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COMMENTS
THE USE OF THE INCOME TAX RETURN IN UNRELATED
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: GARNER v. UNITED STATES
To make the process of revenue collection viable, the government
necessarily requires self-reporting of information from the taxpayer in
the form of an income tax return. However, other uses for which the
income tax return may be utilized present a conflict between the gov-
ernment's legitimate need for information and the individual taxpayer's
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently held in Garner v. United States" that the privilege
against self-incrimination precludes admission of the income tax return
as evidence in criminal prosecutions unrelated to internal revenue laws.
In Garner, the taxpayer complied with the compulsory self-reporting
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code,2 submitting both the sources
and amount of his income. Subsequently, the tax returns were admitted
into evidence in a successful criminal prosecution against Garner for con-
spiring to violate federal gambling statutes.3 On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was required to decide to what extent and under what circum-
stances incriminatory information supplied by a taxpayer in an income
tax return could be used against him in a criminal prosecution unre-
lated to the income tax laws.4 In reversing the taxpayer's conviction,
the court held that the evidentiary use of the tax return in unrelated
prosecutions was an infringement of his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
This decision is in direct conflict with the Second Circuit's recent pro-
nouncement in United States v. Silverman,5 and also conflicts with Fifth
1. No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972), petition for rehearing denied, Sept. 11, 1972.
2. INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 7203, requires taxpayers to file and report income and to
pay taxes thereon. Section 7602 requires the taxpayer to maintain appropriate records to
substantiate the informaton reported on his tax return and section 7604 gives the federal
district courts jurisdiction to compel production of such records. Such statutory schemes
were generally found to be constitutional in United States v. Shlom, 420 F2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970) provides criminal sanctions for the transmission in inter-
state commerce of wagering information.
4. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219, at 2.
5. 449 F.2d 1341 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 U.S. 943 (1972). In Silverman, the
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Circuit holdings in cases with similar fact situations." The purpose of
this Comment is to determine whether Garner is a logical application of
the individual's privilege against self-incrimination or whether it is an
unwarranted extension of the privilege in view of the government's need
for such information. Resolution of this issue ultimately involves a bal-
ancing of the needs of government against the taxpayer's fifth amend-
ment rights. Intially, however, it is necessary to consider the incrimina-
tory nature of information required on tax returns and the existing guide-
lines regarding application of the fifth amendment's guarantees.
WHAT CONSTITUTES SELF-INCRIMINATION
The danger of self-incrimination must be "real and appreciable" and
not merely "imaginary and unsubstantial." " Further, the self-incrimi-
nating disclosures must be compelled; if they are volunteered, there is
no infringement of constitutional rights.8 Although the protection was
first thought to extend only to testimonial disclosures, its scope has since
been broadened to include almost any compelled disclosure that is com-
mumcative.9 The privilege "must be accorded liberal construction in
favor of the right it was intended to secure," '0 and any "link in the
chain" of evidence procured through its violation will vitiate a criminal
conviction.'1 The privilege cannot be abridged or diluted by statute,
where the resulting protection would be less than replete.
In Garner, the court concluded that the statutory scheme of com-
pelled self-reporting was not itself unconstitutional, but rather, that the
taxpayer was presented with an unconstitutional choice. The reporting
government used an attorney's closing statement of contingent fees (required by state
law) as evidence in a criminal prosecution for income tax evasion. In contrast to the
Garner decision, admission of the document was found not to be violative of the de-
fendant's fifth amendment privilege.
6. Grimes v. United States, 379 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967);
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). In
both cases, the incriminating information contained in income tax returns was used as
evidence in an unrelated criminal prosecution.
7 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Accord, United States v. Kordel, 397
U.S. 1 (1970).
8. In United States v. Kane, 450 F.2d 77, 86 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 U.S. 954
(1972), it was held that since the disclosure was not compelled by statute, the taxpayer
was "not constitutionally excused from any resulting prejudice."
9. See, e.g., MCdoRMicK ON EVIDENcE, 264-65 (2d ed. E. Cleary ed. 1972).
10. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).Accord, Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
11. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); United States v. Burr, 25 F Cas.
38, 40 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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of illegal income and sources could result in prosecution for crmiinal
violations which would flow from what the court found to be self-m-
criminating disclosures, while the failure to file or provide all informa-
tion required on the return might result in prosecution for income tax
fraud.'2 Because both alternatives have the effect of placing the tax-
payer in jeopardy of criminal sanction, the Garner court held this statu-
tory scheme to be a form of compulsion prohibited by the fifth amend-
ment. 3 The introduction into evidence of an income tax return to prove
an element of an unrelated crime clearly creates a "real and appreciable"
danger and is precisely the type of "link in the chain of evidence" against
which the fifth amendment protects. The use of the income tax return
in Garner results, therefore, in compelled self-incrimination. But this de-
termination alone does not warrant a conclusion that the fifth amend-
ment protection attaches. There are areas in which the courts have de-
termined limits and conditions applicable to the privilege, even where
the result is compelled self-incrimination.
AREAS WHERE THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN DEFINED
Waiver
In reaching its decision the Garner court expressly overruled its previ-
ous holding in Stillman v. United States, 4 thereby rejecting the implied
waiver doctrine. The concept of implied waiver as it relates to income
tax returns originated in Sullivan v. United States, which held that a
taxpayer has no valid constitutional defense for refusing to file an in-
12. The court in Garner refers to this as a Hobson's choice. "If a gambler fails to
provide this [incriminating] information, he subjects himself to a criminal prosecution
for tax evasion or perjury; his 'choice' to disclose is thus a Hobson's choice." Garner
v. United States, No. 71-1219, at 6.
13. Id. at 2. It was not the compelled reporting which the court found abhorrent, but
rather the unrestricted use which the government was allowed to make of the informa-
tion:
It is one thing to say that government can compel a person to make dis-
closures which are deemed necessary for government to adequately adminis-
ter a program such as the revenue collection system. It is entirely another
matter, however, to then disregard the fact that the disclosure was forced
and to say that, since the original purpose of compelling disclosure was not
inherently hazardous to an individual's rights, any subsequent use of that
compelled information is the use of "volunteered" information and therefore
constitutionally inoffensive.
Id. at 6, 7.
14. 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
15. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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come tax return. Although the narrow holding of the Supreme Court
was that the "protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far" 16
when applied to the filing requirement in such a way as to permit a fail-
ure to file, dictum in Sullivan did suggest that the taxpayer could refuse
to answer specific questions which he deemed to be incriminating. The
Stillman court, adopting reasoning consistent with the Sullivan dictum,
held that the taxpayer had a right to refuse to give incriminating re-
sponses on the tax return but that a failure to assert the privilege at that
time constituted- an implied waiver.1 The rejection of implied waiver
in Garner directly conflicts with Fifth Circuit decisions which have up-
held the theory upon reasoning consistent with the Sullivan-Stillman ap-
proach."
The Supreme Court recently restricted the implied waiver theory in
Marchettz v. United State?9 and related cases, 20 ruling that "in an area
permeated with criminal activity," 21 a self-reporting statute directed
principally at a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activity," 22 is an unconstitutional infringement of the individual's privi-
16. Id. at 263.
17. In Stillman, the court stated that:
If appellants believed that certain declarations in their tax returns might in-
crimunate them they could have refrained from making the voluntary tax
declarations here in evidence. However, they chose to report the illicit
income rather than risk possible prosecution for making false or incomplete
returns covering such income. The disclosures upon the tax returns must
therefore he deemed to have been voluntarily entered upon a public
record.
Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607, 618 (9th Cir. 1949).
18. Grimes v. United States, 179 F.2d 791 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967);
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
In Grimes, the taxpayer stated on his income tax return that his source of income was
gambling, and this disclosure was subsequently used against him in an unrelated criminal
prosecution. The court felt that: "Not claiming [is privilege against self-incrimnation]
then, is statement amounted to a voluntary admission which we hold could be used in
this prosecution." Id. at 796. Likewise, in Stillman, the court held that "ft]he income
tax returns were voluntarily executed [and] . the disclosures upon the tax
returns must therefore be deemed to have been voluntarily entered upon a public
record." Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607, 618 (9th Cit. 1949).
19. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
20. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968). Marchetti and Grosso involved a statute requiring a gambler to register and
pay a wagering occupational tax. Haynes, decided the same day, dealt with an
analogous statute, the National Firearms Act, which required the self-reporting of the
possession of illegal firearms.
21. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
22. Id.
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lege against self-incrimination. Although the statutes were not held un-
constitutional per se, an individual who properly asserts the constitu-
tional privilege in the absence of use restrictions or immunity cannot be
punished for failure to comply.2 3
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Garner agreed that the
Marchetri cases are distinguishable in that the statutes in Marchettt re-
quired self-reporting of inherently criminal activity, whereas the income
tax return in Garner was neutral; i.e., the return was not permeated with
criminal elements, but a potential for disclosure of criminal activity ex-
isted. Marchetti did, however, further emphasize the principle that
courts will "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights" 24 and "will not presume acquiescence
in the loss of [these] rights." 25
The use of "implied waiver" is- thus a mere expedient for avoiding
the constitutional confrontation between government and individual.
It imputes an intentional waiver of a constitutional right to an individ-
ual who fails to assert the privilege at the proper time. In light of Mar-
cbetti, it is a doctrine of questionable vitality, 6 and its specific rejection
is fundamental to the Garner majority opinion. A waiver of constitu-
tional rights should be manifested by clear and unequivocal words or
deeds and not by operation of the law.2s
Regulatory, Non-Crimnal Self-Reporting
The Supreme Court, in California v. Byers,9 reiterated the require-
ment, first enunciated in Brown v. Walker,0 that the threat of self-in-
23. Marchetti v. Umted States, 390 US. 39, 61 (1968); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969). Cf. lannelli v. Long, 333 F Supp. 407 (WD). Pa. 1971). In United States v.
Loolretis, 398 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1968), unlike the other cases following Marcbetti, the
taxpayer did comply with the federal wagering tax statutes. In this case, the court
imposed a use restriction on the compelled disclosures-the same remedy fashioned in
Garner.
24. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1957).
25. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
26. "[In view of recent constitutional developments, this concept [implied waiver)
'has no place where the issue involves the assertion of a constitutional right and, con-
sequently, we believe that the Supreme Court has eliminated the doctrinal keystone of
the Stiliman decision." Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219, at 4.
27. Although the implied waiver theory is no longer viable, a recent Supreme Court
decision suggests that the privilege may, in effect,.be waived if the taxpayer responds
with false information. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969)
28. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
29. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
30. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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crimination must be "real and substantial" and not trivial, implying that
where the threat of self-incrimination is de mimnus, the privilege does
not attach. In Byers, the driver of an automobile involved in an acci-
dent was convicted for failure to stop and give his name and address,
in violation of a "hit and run" statuteY1 On appeal, the California Su-
preme Court held that, absent restrictions on the use of the disclosures,
the statute was unconstitutional." The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
Ing that there was no infringement of the self-incrimination privilege.
The Court reasoned that "disclosures with respect to automobile acci-
dents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimina-
tion involved in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes... [and] ... [f]urther-
more, the statutory purpose is non-criminal and self-reporting is indis-
pensable to its fulfillment." n Although Byers and Garner appear to be
factually similar,3 the similarity is minimized when one considers the
question whether giving the sources of illegal income is as "neutral" an
act as furnishing a name and address. Further, the majority in Garner
distinguished Byers on two bases: First, the defendant in Byers refused
to yield to the self-reporting requirement, whereas the taxpayer in
Garner complied with the reporting statute; 5 This distinction does not
destroy the basic similarity, however. Both statutes are essentially regu-
latory and non-criminal. Additionally, self-reporting is indispensable
to their respective regulatory functions, and the probability of self-in-
crimination is not substantial in either instance.
The court's second ground for distinguishing Byers concerned the
ultimate use of the information. The information from the accident re-
port was used to further the statutory purpose for which it was elicited-
to facilitate the determination of liability for automobile accidents. Fail-
ure to comply resulted in a conviction pursuant to that scheme. By con-
trast, the information for the tax return was used not to determine tax
liability but as evidentiary criminal matter in a prosecution for an offense
31. CAL. VEHICLE CooE, § 20002 (a) (1) (West 1971)
32. Byers v. Justice Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 458 P.2d 465, 467 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
33. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Cf. United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d
799 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). In the latter case, an individual was
convicted of violating a federal smuggling statute by failing to report certain items.
As in Byers, the laws violated "were imposed in an essentially non-crimmal area and
were primarily designed to produce federal revenue." Id. at 800.
34. The plurality in Byers stated that "[T]here is no constitutional right to refuse
to file an income tax return or to flee the scene of an accident m order to avoid the
possibility of legal involvement." 402 U.S. at 434. The Court also indicated that the
"[d]isclosure of name and address is an essentially neutral act." id. at 432.
35. Garner v. Umted States, No. 71-1219, at 5.
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unrelated to the law which compelled the reporting of.the information
in the first instance. In light of an individual's fifth amendment privi-
lege, the question becomes whether the government can use informa-
tion gathered for a specific purpose to fulfill any other needs or whether
its use as evidence ought to be restricted to the purpose for which the
information was originally required. Analysis of the income tax return
as a public document is helpful in considering this fundamental issue.
The Required Records Doctrine
The required records doctrine, first enunciated in Shapiro v. United
States,86 permits the government to require and to utilize certain infor-
mation regardless of any fifth amendment claim. The Supreme Court,
in Grosso v. United StatesiT elucidated the legal basis for this doctrine:
The premises of the rule as it is described in Shapiro are evidently
three: first, the purposes of the United States inquiry must be es-
sentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by re-
quiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated
party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must
have assumed the 'public aspects' which render them at least anal-
ogous to public documents38
By requiring that the records be used essentially for a regulatory pur-
pose, the Court defined the area in which information can be compelled,
and impliedly refused to sanction laws which would compel self-report-
ing for the sole purpose of crime detection. The "public aspect" is a
term which describes a vesting of governmental interest in the docu-
ment, so that the individual is considered merely a custodian for the gov-
ernment. Although the defimtion of the doctrine is clear, the scope of
its application is uncertain.
Two conflicting-but nonetheless reasonable-interpretations of the
Shapiro doctrine seem possible. Arguably, once the document fulfills
the prerequisites delineated in Shapiro, it becomes a public document to
be used for any and all purposes, so that the self-incrimination privilege
can be regarded as inapplicable. This is a broad interpretation of the
requirement that the purpose of an inquiry must be essentially regula-
tory. Under this approach, an income tax return filed pursuant to a valid
36. 335 US. 1 (1948).
37. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
38. Id. at 67-68.
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regulatory scheme becomes a. public document with no restrictions on
its use.
This argument is supported by the recent Second Circuit decision in
United States v, Silverman,9 wich held that the closing statements filed
by a lawyer pursuant to a state regulatory scheme became public infor-
mation for some purposes. The self-incrimination clami was found un-
availing when the documents subsequently were introduced as evidence
in a prosecution for income tax evasion. The similarity to the Garner
fact situation is strikmg. However, in Garner the Ninth Circuit held
that the privilege attaches, thereby implicitly rejecting the Second Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the Shapiro doctrine.
Shapiro also is subject to the interpretation that the reporting require-
ment pursuant to a valid regulatory purpose renders the documents pub-
lic only for the purpose for which the information was elicited. The
Garner court adopted this restrictive interpretation of Shapiro in hold-
ing that a tax return can be used in furtherance of the government's
statutory scheme of enforcement of income tax laws, but not as evidence
in unrelated crminal proceedings.
The expansive interpretation of Shapiro protects the government's
need for information, whereas the narrow reading affords the individual
a greater degree of protection against self-incrirmnation. Neither ap-
proach effectively resolves the conflict between the needs of the gov-
ernment and those of the individual. Even under the broadest interpre-
tation of Shapiro, three conditions must be satisfied before the docu-
ment assumes a completely "public" aspect. Likewise, under the narrow
interpretation, the use restriction applies only to the document itself
(and not to the information), and then only to unrelated criminal prose-
cutions.
The determinative issue, then, is how far the self-incrimination privi-
lege should be extended into this difficult area. The ultimate interpreta-
don of Shapiro will result from balancing the legitimate needs of gov-
ernment against the self-incrimination privilege. As Justice Harlan stated
in California v. Byers:
In other words, we must deal in degrees in this troublesome area.
The question whether some sort of immumty is required as a con-
dition of compelled self-reporting inescapably requires an evalua-
39. 449 F.2d 1341 (2d Cir. 1971). "Records required to be kept pursuant to a reason-
able regulatory scheme have 'public aspects' and may be examined for evidence of
criminal conduct.. " Id. at 1345.
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non of the assertedly non-crimmal governmental purpose in secur-
ing the information, the necessity for self-reporting as a means of
securing the information, and the nature of the disclosures re-
quired.40
The narrow interpretation of Shapiro comes closest to striking a proper
balance between the needs of the government and those of the individual.
This approach allows the government to compel information which is
indispensable to successful enforcement of a particular regulatory
scheme, and yet affords the individual adequate protection. The pur-
pose of the Sbaptra doctrine was to compel disclosures required for
successful inplementation of the statute's goals. To adopt the broader
interpretation of that decision would seem to be an unwarranted exten-
sion of the "public records" character of the tax return and an unneces-
sary infringement upon the fifth amendment privilege.
CONCLUSION
Three solutions to the public necessity-private right conflict seem
possible. Each must be analyzed in relation to its efficacy in striking a
proper balance. The first is the broad interpretation of Shapiro allow-
ing unrestricted use of the income tax return by the government. While
ostensibly offering optimum efficiency in eliciting information, such a
solution infringes upon the fifth amendment privilege. 41 Moreover, in-
troduction of the tax return as evidence in prosecutions unrelated to in-
ternal revenue laws probably would inhibit the reporting of income and
collection of revenue. Fear that non-tax-related criminal prosecution
could result from a truthful filing would enhance the temptation to
falsify a return or to evade payment completely.
A second solution is to grant immunity to the taxpayer who files a
truthful return. Immuity is most appropriate whenever the govern-
ment's interest in eliciting information exceeds its interest in criminal
prosecution. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, immunity was held to mean
transactional immunity, that is, protection from prosecution encompass-
ing any transaction to which a witness was compelled to testify. To grant
transactional immuity to a taxpayer would resolve summarily the con-
40. Califorma v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 454 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). -
41. See, e.g.,'Spevack v. Klein, 385 'U.S. 511 (1967!3; Slochower v Board of Educ',350
U.S. 551 (-1956); Comment, Self-Incrin ination and the Federal Excise Tax on Gambling,
76 YALE L.J. 839 (1967). .
42. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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flict between -the individual's rights and the government's needs in tavor
of the individual. If a valid claim of privilege provides total immunity
from all prosecution, however, much needed information would be ren-
dered useless. Such an approach would preclude a meaningful balancing
of interests.
The third solution is to resolve the conflict by balancing governmental
needs against individual rights on a case by case basis, as was done in
California v. Byers. Where the government's needs and the individual's
rights conflict, both should yield to some extent, so that a viable accom-
modation can be realized. The result in Garner-imposition of an evi-
dentiary use restriction on the income tax return but not on the infor-
mation itself-represents such a balancing. However, Garner was based
upon a specific rejection of implied waiver, so that although its result
was correct, its reasoning does not support this approach.43
The balancing solution not only comports with the result in Garner,
but also accords with the narrow interpretation of Sbapiro By allowing
compelled self-incrimination to be used for regulatory purposes but pro-
hibiting its use in unrelated criminal prosecutions, the legitimate interest
of the government and the constitutional privilege of the individual
are both given optimum recognition. Such a balance seems to be the
only logical approach where there are two conflicting substantial needs
which require protection.
43. Although the Garner court does not speak of balancing, it does state that its ap-
proach is an examination of the "context" in which the disclosures were made, which
indicates a willingness to approach the problem in terms of degree of danger of self-
incrimination. Garner v. Umted States, No. 71-1219, at 5.
